Xenophobia in South Africa and Migrant Deportation

Recent Wave of Xenophobia and Migrant Expulsions in South Africa

South Africa is experiencing a severe escalation of anti-migrant mobilisation, xenophobic violence, forced displacement, and state-led immigration enforcement. The crisis has brought together long-standing socioeconomic pressures, organised vigilante movements, inflammatory political rhetoric and the government’s intensified campaign against undocumented migration.

Although the government maintains that its actions target immigration status rather than nationality, the violence and enforcement measures have disproportionately affected migrants from neighbouring African countries. The developments have also generated diplomatic tensions and humanitarian pressures across the Southern African region.

Diego Delso, CC BY-SA 4.0

Historical and Socioeconomic Background

South Africa has been a major destination for migrants since the end of apartheid. Its comparatively large economy, relatively developed infrastructure, and demand for labour have attracted people from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, and other African countries. Many migrants work in construction, domestic labour, agriculture, logistics, hospitality, and informal commerce, while others seek protection as refugees or asylum seekers.

Xenophobic violence is not new. The country experienced major attacks against foreign nationals in 2008, when at least 62 people were killed and more than 100,000 were displaced. Subsequent waves of violence and intimidation have repeatedly targeted migrants, particularly those from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These earlier episodes established a pattern in which economic insecurity and failures of public governance are redirected toward foreign nationals.

The current wave is unfolding amid severe structural pressures:

• South Africa continues to face exceptionally high unemployment, widespread poverty, and deep inequality.

• Public services, including healthcare, housing, education, and municipal infrastructure, remain under significant strain.

• Crime, corruption, electricity shortages, and weak service delivery have intensified public frustration.

• Migrants are frequently accused (without reliable evidence) of taking jobs, using public services, operating businesses illegally, or contributing to crime.

• Political and grassroots actors have increasingly turned anti-migrant rhetoric into a strategy for mobilising public anger.

These conditions do not demonstrate that migrants are responsible for South Africa’s socioeconomic problems. Rather, they create an environment in which migrants can be presented as visible and politically convenient scapegoats.

Organised Anti-Migrant Mobilisation

One of the most prominent groups in the current mobilisation is March and March, led by Jacinta Ngobese-Zuma. The movement has campaigned against what it calls “illegal immigration” and has linked undocumented migration to unemployment, crime, healthcare access, and the perceived failure of the state to protect South African citizens.

The group and allied anti-migrant organisations established 30 June 2026 as an unofficial deadline for undocumented migrants to leave the country.

The campaign was not limited to formal demonstrations. In several communities, anti-migrant activists conducted patrols, raids, and door-to-door actions. Individuals were sometimes targeted on the basis of their language, accent, appearance, or presumed nationality.

As a result, the violence affected not only undocumented migrants but also recognised refugees, asylum seekers, permanent residents, naturalised citizens, and South Africans perceived to be foreign.

The civil-society coalition Siyafana Sonke, which represents more than 160 organisations, has described the situation as a humanitarian and political crisis. The coalition has called for an end to forced removals, protection for displaced migrants, and a state response directed at perpetrators of violence rather than at migrant communities as a whole.

Escalation and Violence

In the weeks preceding and following 30 June, protests occurred in several South African cities. Some demonstrations remained peaceful, but others involved looting, attacks on migrant-owned businesses, unlawful evictions, property destruction, and physical assaults. South African police reported more than 900 arrests during the nationwide protests on 30 June.

At least four people were killed during the violence surrounding the deadline, while thousands of foreign nationals were forced to leave their homes or seek protection in churches, mosques, embassies, community halls, and temporary shelters.

The violence has also affected migrant-owned shops and informal businesses. Their destruction therefore threatens livelihoods and deepens economic insecurity in the communities where the attacks occur.

Government Response and Scale of Removals

President Cyril Ramaphosa has condemned xenophobic violence and vigilantism. The government has also warned anti-migrant groups against taking the law into their own hands and has announced diplomatic efforts to reassure neighbouring governments.

At the same time, immigration enforcement has expanded significantly. According to a South African government update, 53,449 foreign nationals had been processed for deportation or repatriation by 11 July 2026. More than 80 percent were from Malawi, followed by nationals of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. However, the official figure includes both deportations and assisted or voluntary repatriations and should therefore not be described as a total number of forced expulsions.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has called on South Africa to investigate attacks, prosecute perpetrators, dismantle vigilante structures, protect migrants in high-risk areas, and address the socioeconomic conditions that facilitate xenophobia.

Janah Hattingh, CC BY 2.0

Consequences for Neighbouring Countries

The crisis has consequences that extend well beyond South Africa’s borders. Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and other countries have had to respond to threats against their citizens, organise emergency transport, and provide consular assistance.

Malawi

Malawian nationals constitute the largest group among those processed for deportation. Malawi has organised transport for citizens wishing to return, while many others have left South Africa independently or remain in temporary shelters awaiting assistance. The large-scale return of workers may place additional pressure on Malawi’s labour market, public services, and household economies.The return process can therefore produce economic hardship even where it is officially described as voluntary.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has also facilitated the return of citizens from South Africa, including people who feared attacks or faced economic insecurity. Zimbabwean migrants have historically formed one of the largest foreign-born communities in South Africa, and many maintain families and economic ties across the border. Similarly, large-scale returns may increase pressure on Zimbabwe’s already fragile employment and social-support systems.

Mozambique

Mozambican nationals have likewise been affected by attacks and repatriation efforts. The crisis is particularly sensitive because the two countries share extensive social, economic, and family connections. The return of Mozambican workers may disrupt cross-border livelihoods, while reports of violence against Mozambican nationals have increased public and diplomatic concern in Maputo.

Lesotho and Other Countries

Lesotho, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and other countries have issued safety warnings, supported repatriation efforts, or requested regional and continental action.

These developments create several broader regional risks:

• Diplomatic tensions: Governments may view attacks and mass removals as evidence that South Africa is failing to protect foreign nationals.

• Humanitarian pressure: Neighbouring countries must absorb returning people, including families who may have lost housing, employment, documentation, or personal belongings.

• Economic effects: Reduced remittances and the sudden return of workers may affect household incomes and local labour markets.

• Border pressure: Large-scale movements may produce congestion, administrative delays, and difficulties distinguishing voluntary return from forced expulsion.

• Regional insecurity: Fear of attacks may encourage irregular border crossings, secondary migration, or further displacement.

• Damage to regional integration: The crisis challenges the ideals of African solidarity, free movement, and regional cooperation associated with the Southern African Development Community.

Conclusion

South Africa’s current wave of xenophobia is not an isolated outbreak of public hostility. It is the result of the interaction between long-standing regional migration patterns, severe domestic socioeconomic pressures, organised anti-migrant mobilisation, and an increasingly punitive state response.

The effects are being felt across Southern Africa. Without a rights-based and regionally coordinated response, the current crisis risks reinforcing a cycle in which socioeconomic frustration is redirected toward migrants.

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Author: Janna, 09.08.2026, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0